


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


A * Leaf

from the

History of the

⇒ Rebellion.



W. B. WILSON.

1888.





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A LEAF FROM

THE

HISTORY OF THE REBELLION.

SKETCHES OF EVENTS AND PERSONS.

BY

WILLIAM B. ^{ender} WILSON,

A MILITARY TELEGRAPHER OF THE TIME.

HOLMESBURG, PHILADELPHIA,
June 26, 1888.

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*Dedicated to the memory of Thomas A. Scott, who, in
life, whether in times of War or in times of Peace, was
a foremost citizen in defending his country's rights and
advancing its prosperity.*



A LEAF FROM THE HISTORY OF THE REBELLION.

THE battle of Bull Run and its attending disasters threw the country into a great turmoil of excitement. The loyal people were appalled when the startling fact broke upon them that they had vastly underrated the strength, power and resources of the enemy. They saw that they were sadly disappointed in their supposition that the army of raw levies from the workshops, fields, counters and offices of the North, accustomed only to the avocations of peace, would, in three short months, whip a military people, fighting under the stimulus of desperation.

“Bull Run” was an error which a round of circumstances made the government commit. The three months’ enlistments were drawing to the end of the term, the troops, not satisfied with the great works they had performed of saving the Capital, desired a taste of war’s bitter fruits in the frenzied fray; influences from civil life clamored for a battle, and everywhere throughout the land the cry of “On to Richmond” could be heard; capitalists who

had loaned the government their wealth, Senators and Representatives in Congress who had the voting of supplies and the radical abolitionists with an impetuosity inborn of their detestation of slavery, demanded a demonstration against the enemy. The President at last gave way under the pressure thus brought to bear upon him and added his voice to the throng in urging an onward movement. Long and fervent were the remonstrances of the veteran General Scott and the young and intrepid McDowell, but they too had to give way to the noisy clamors, and the consequence was an order for McDowell to advance his army on Manassas the stronghold of the enemy. The result, that toughly-contested battle, fought on a hot Sunday, which brought so much distress, dismay and disgrace to the arms of the Union.

Whilst the action was progressing I was on duty in the War Department at Washington as military telegraph operator and around me was gathered one of the most illustrious groups brought together during the war with the Confederate States, to witness on that beautiful Sunday the tragedy being enacted on the banks of Bull Run.

Military science, surrendered to the passions of the people, had passed under newspaper and partisan political control, and the group had gathered to watch the practical effects of that surrender, little dreaming what the declining of that day's sun would disclose.

The group was composed of President Lincoln, William H. Seward, Simon Cameron, Salmon P. Chase, Gideon

Welles and Edward Bates, of the Cabinet; Colonels Townsend, Van Rensselaer, Hamilton and Wright, of General Scott's staff; General Mansfield, commanding the defences of Washington, and Colonel Thomas A. Scott of Pennsylvania. With maps of the field before them they watched, as it were, the conflict of arms as it progressed, at the same time keeping up a running desultory conversation.

The military telegraph which had not yet reached the efficiency which afterwards characterised it, extended only to Fairfax Court House from which point General McDowell kept the authorities advised of his movements. Hour after hour the couriers reported unbrokenly that our troops were steadily forcing the enemy back, but as that was expected the reports only tended to increase the complacent satisfaction with which all of the party seemed to be possessed.

A despatch had been received from General Robert Patterson the evening before announcing that Johnston had eluded him, but the sanguine feeling which animated the group was in no wise abated by that knowledge or by the probability of Johnston forming a junction with Beauregard that day.

The day passed quietly in the Department, all present looking forward with an abiding confidence for McDowell's success.

Mr. Lincoln, deeply impressed with the responsibilities of the occasion, wore a quiet dignity and his observations

on the pending conflict were free from humor and were few and measured.

Mr. Seward, complacently smoking a cigar, displayed a consciousness that his prophecy of a thirty days' war was about being verified.

Mr. Cameron, not doubting the result of the day's work, yet not sharing in Mr. Seward's views as to the duration of the war with the forces then in hand, gave expression to his opinions in the forcible, practical manner for which he was distinguished.

The military gentlemen explained movements besides occasionally withdrawing themselves for the purpose of advising General Scott of the battle's progress, he being too much enfeebled by the infirmities of age to leave his quarters.

The other gentlemen of the group were deeply interested observers.

Up to half past three o'clock in the afternoon advices from McDowell were frequent, the despatches at that hour indicating that he was pressing Beauregard back to Manasses Junction. From then on until the shades of evening were drawing on apace an ominous silence settled upon the telegraph. The conversation of the gentlemen took a speculative turn on the causes of the sudden cessation of information from the field, the generally expressed opinion being that McDowell, flushed with victory, was too busily engaged in securing its fruits to write despatches.

But as time wore on, and speculation had almost given way to impatience, the throbbing instrument broke its long silence and told that "Our army is retreating." Such information being entirely unexpected, was received at first with incredulity but as corroboration soon followed, and the fact became apparent that the army was not only retreating but was flying in a panic, it was received and accepted with outward composure. There was no consternation and but a feeble ripple of excitement of momentary duration and scarcely discernable. As the result was the opposite of the anticipations, it would be expected that the sudden revulsion would have at least produced great excitement, but whatever may have been the thoughts and feelings of these gentlemen they kept them closely veiled as the truth was being revealed. Mr. Seward smoked on without the slightest perturbation being shown upon his countenance in his manner or speech. The days of his prophecy were ended and he extricated himself from the consequences of their not bringing fulfilment by extending them to a later period. Colonel Thomas A. Scott, turning to General Mansfield, said, quietly, "General, it would be well to man your fortifications and stay this retreat," and then left the Department with Mr. Cameron for the purpose of holding a consultation with General Scott. As the telegraph reported the terrible scenes and heartrending stories of sufferings during the progress of that never-to-be-forgotten flight, Mr. Lincoln felt that the hour of the nation's greatest peril was opening and while

making preparations to meet it, the saddened lines of his countenance deepened and his whole soul seemed to go out in sympathy to the dying, the sick and wounded, the foot-sore and the weary.

General Scott could not understand that a "hero of one hundred battles" could be beaten, and he only believed when the advancing hurricane of the flying panic-stricken army sounded its approach to the Capital. When the veteran at last believed he gave me an autograph order to suppress all news of the disaster which might be offered for telegraphing to the country. Armed with this document I drove down Pennsylvania avenue to the American Telegraph Office and notified its manager of the commands of the General-in-Chief. Piled upon the telegraph tables were "specials" from the field describing, in thrilling language—as only the "War Correspondent" could describe—the scenes and events of the day. All intimations of disaster were ruthlessly cut from the specials and only the rose coloring permitted to be telegraphed. Thus it was that whilst the gloom of the darkest hour in the Republic's history hung like a pall over Washington City, throughout the North bells were ringing out rejoicings over the glad tidings of victory.

Telegrams were sent to General McClellan, at Beverly, in Western Virginia, informing him of a "repulse," to McDowell, and to Generals Banks and Dix—both of whom were in Baltimore—instructing them to keep their men under arms. No official telegrams for aid were sent at

this time, but Colonel Thomas A. Scott, with a keen perception of the situation and foreseeing the necessities of the morrow, sent a telegram to Governor Curtin, at Harrisburg, which, in conception and composition, was so characteristic of the man who no sooner saw a want than he comprehended its supply, that I give its entire text here :

“ WASHINGTON, *July 21, 1861.*

“ Hon. A. G. CURTIN, *Harrisburg, Pa. :*

“Get your regiments at Harrisburg, Easton and other points ready for immediate shipment ; lose no time in preparing ; make things move to the utmost.

(Signed)

“ THOMAS A. SCOTT.”

This dispatch anticipated, by many hours, any official action looking towards a call for “ more troops.” The reply to it was found in the hastening of the famous Pennsylvania Reserves to the relief of the threatened Capital. Mr. Lincoln lingered around the War Department until after two o'clock in the morning when he retired to the White House leaving Mr. Scott on guard, an active, watchful sentinel of the movements of the night. Had the country been consulted, there could not have been selected from among its patriotic sons, an abler, truer, wiser, braver guardian, than the noble Pennsylvanian whom Mr. Lincoln left on guard to care for its interests in the crisis which had come upon it.

At the close of the battle of Bull Run, Washington City was crowded with a disorganized, demoralized mob,

scarcely controllable, which had taken the shortest routes from the battle-field to the Capital. The most of the persons composing it were eagerly demanding their discharges, as the term of their enlistments had either expired or were expiring. 'Twas indeed a dark day that had fallen upon the country. A strong and victorious enemy, jubilant over its success, was threatening the very gates of the Capital, whilst their defenders, scattered and unmanageable, were parading the streets and avenues in grotesque parties spinning yarns of individual valor.

General Simon Cameron held the portfolio of the Department of War. He was assisted by Colonel Thomas A. Scott, one of the best-equipped and practical minds of the day, a man whose energy and applicability enabled him to surmount any difficulty that might be thrown in his way.

At a consultation held immediately after the battle, it was determined upon bringing the young military chieftain, General McClellan, from the scene of his successes in Western Virginia to reorganize the army for the defence of the Union. With his prestige, ability and ardor he soon brought order out of chaos, and had a large army in training on the banks of the Potomac. A perfect net work of fortifications sprung up around Washington at the hands of accomplished and experienced engineers. Daily troops were worked up into beautiful human machines whose every movement betokened harmony of action. Colonel Lorenzo Thomas was made, by brevet, a Brigadier General

and occupied the post of Adjutant General; Captain Meigs, an eminent engineer, whose work upon the Washington aqueduct and the dome of the Capitol had given him a world-wide reputation, was appointed Quartermaster General, with the rank of brevet Brigadier General; Colonel J. W. Ripley, advanced to similar rank, was promoted to Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, and Colonel Joseph Taylor, brother of old "Rough and Ready," acted as Commissary General of Subsistence.

The army, under the auspices of these learned military men, became, as it were, an army of veterans, ever ready for the fray in which they might retrieve the Nation's honor and punish treason. The summer wore away in bringing the army into condition and insuring the invulnerability of the political metropolis of the country, and just as the frosts of autumn had rendered an advance upon the enemy practicable, rains set in, causing Virginia's proverbially bad roads to become perfectly impassable. Rains continued throughout the fall and winter. Roads had no bottoms and the ground became so thoroughly saturated that at the close of 1861 and the commencement of 1862, regimental and even company drill had to be abandoned. The pickets in camp and on the outposts, stationed in the most advantageous positions, unable to *walk* their posts, plodded them, and that often through mud to their ankles. The only consolation our troops gave themselves in their mud-bound condition was that of believing the enemy were in no better condition. The

only difference which did exist, was, that whilst our army, ever prepared for an advance, waited for propitious weather in tents, the enemy had gone into comparatively comfortable winter quarters.

During the time the grand Army of the Potomac lay thus inactive, independent movements were made and large drafts for the men to carry them into effect were made upon it. These movements and depletions of his ranks were strenuously opposed by General McClellan, on the ground of bad policy. He contended that whilst it weakened his army the advantages arising from striking at and occupying isolated points in the South could in no way be equal to those that would arise from his bearing down with a large and overwhelming force upon the positions where the strength of the enemy was centered. Further, that concentration, not the isolation, of divisions was the true principle upon which the war should be conducted, to bring the rebellion to a speedy conclusion. This sage and deep reasoning was overthrown and he was compelled to see some of his choicest troops taken away from him, but to his honor and patriotism be it said, that the moment the policy of independent movements were resolved upon, he gave all his talents and energy to ensure their success.

The retiracy of General Winfield Scott, in the fall of 1861, caused the appointment of McClellan as General Commanding the United States Army. Multiplied as his duties became, by reason of his advancement, he did

not shrink an instant from the responsibilities of his position, but went to work with an energy which soon infused new life into the whole army. He planned his campaign, then set to work in bringing his combinations to perfection. Day and night have I seen him busily engaged moving the vast machinery of the whole army and personally attending to the details of the management of his immediate command—the great Army of the Potomac. Not a moment of time did he devote to himself excepting such hours as nature demanded for repose, and those he curtailed to the utmost limit. His meals were oftenest eaten whilst he labored. A little wicker basket, containing a few sandwiches, some bread and cheese, and now and then a tart—was the storehouse from which for days he drew his only provisions. The results of his excessive labors and close confinement to duty were shown, in colors of brilliancy, by the gallant achievements in the west, the restoration of Kentucky and Tennessee to the Union, the evacuation of Manasses and Corinth, the re-opening of the Mississippi and the occupation of New Orleans.

These glorious results were clearly attributable to the genius of McClellan, and would have been the forerunner of greater achievements, bringing the war to a close, with a restored Union, within eighteen months from the time Sumter was fired upon, had he been allowed to pursue his plans to their final consummation. But it was not to be so. Simon Cameron resigned as Secretary of War and Edwin M. Stanton appointed his successor. From this

moment the policy of the Department of War changed. Mr. Stanton had a national reputation of being an eminent legal scholar but withal he was ambitious to unhealthiness, egotistic, bombastic, arrogant and untruthful. He was called upon to act in a department, the highly patriotic duties of which he was entirely unfitted for. It was peculiarly unfortunate that Mr. Lincoln's foresightedness should have failed him when he consented to the appointment of Stanton. We can only lament it that it did. The fulsome laudations of the press of the country, soon raised Stanton to a standard far beyond his caliber and the people, so prone to allow their enthusiasm to carry their judgment beyond the line of prudence, carried the standard to a more giddy height so that Stanton, looking in any direction, saw nothing but himself. His egoism and vanity were catered to, causing him to assume the position he did which proved so disastrous to the country. His incapacity to wield the scepter placed in his hands soon showed itself.

Simon Cameron and Thomas A. Scott, unaided, had performed all the necessary administrative work of the Department in raising, equipping, organizing and placing in the field an army of six hundred thousand men besides receiving and hearing the large crowds of people who, in rapid streams, flowed into Washington from all quarters of the country. Day and night they were accessible to any person that might call upon them. Mark the effect of the change. Secretary Cameron's resignation took place when the army was ready to move and the business of the

Department had dwindled down to mere routine, but, notwithstanding this, Mr. Stanton must have three Assistant Secretaries of War and a large addition to his corps of clerks, and after he received them he must deny audiences four days in the week to all callers, the President and members of the Cabinet alone excepted. On the remaining two days he graciously permitted access to his presence, designating five hours of one day as the time for Senators and members of Congress and five hours of the other day as the time for the general public and officers of the army to call.

The atmosphere of the Department soon thickened with the atoms of autocracy and snobbery, erstwhile found flying around the heads of royalty, but which now had effected a lodgement on and around Mr. Stanton's desk.

The reason announced for the enlargement of the force and curtailment of the freedom of access was that such action was necessary for the expedition of business. If such necessity existed, it was a thousand times more urgent under Cameron than under Stanton, but the fact is that it did not exist at all, and the only reasonable explanation of Stanton's action was to be found in an overwhelming desire on his part to surround himself with a seeming inapproachableness so as to enable him to undo all that had been done by his predecessor. That he succeeded in obtaining his desire is fully attested by subsequent events. Enlistments were stopped, and the ranks of the army, instead of being kept up to a standard of six hundred

thousand fighting men, were being reduced daily by sickness and the casualties of war, and no one to fill up the vacant files.

McClellan forced the enemy to abandon his extremely strong position at Manassas, and then sought a new base of operations in the Peninsula. Evacuation by the enemy of Yorktown and the lines of the James, Chickahominy and York rivers to a new position within a few miles of Richmond was an early result. McClellan was thus in a position to realize his fond anticipations of bringing the war to a speedy conclusion, but the policy of the War Department was against him and it was impossible for him to successfully contend with that enemy in the rear, and the armed foe in the front. The failure of McDowell to form a junction with him, and the non-arrival of needed reinforcements caused the necessity for the change of base to the James River accompanied by the "Seven days' fight" with all its attendant casualties. The President on appeal said every man was sent McClellan that could be sent him; that they had no more to send. That was unquestionably true. But why? Enlistments had stopped when they should have gone on, at least until such time as would be required to have a sufficient force in reserve for just such emergencies as arose. Cameron's policy would have insured a patriotic army of a million of men, and operations would not have had to be suspended a moment for new levies to be made. Reserves under that policy could have been sent forward to close decimated ranks, enabling a steady

advance of the Union columns upon all those spots where the Confederacy had its armed forces. "No men to send" caused Banks to retreat to the Potomac, and laid open to the enemy the beautiful Valley of the Shenandoah. Yet Banks' retreat was not a warning. To be sure it fired the patriotic heart of the country, and caused large numbers of able-bodied men to rush forward and tender their services to the Government, but the Government, under the baneful influence of Stanton and his policy, cooled the ardor of the people by refusing to accept the noble offers, on the pretext that there were sufficient men in the field. Had those sons of constitutional liberty been accepted, McClellan could have had an overwhelming force at his command with which to destroy the Southern Army, capture Richmond and close the war.

Whilst McClellan was at Harrison's Landing putting the Army of the Potomac into condition for a movement upon Richmond, and calling for reinforcements that never came, the War Department authorities at Washington were again tampering with the organization of the Army. The corps of McDowell, Banks and Fremont, and the garrison of Washington, which had been detached from McClellan's command, were organized into the "Army of Virginia," and placed under the command of Major General John Pope, who signalized his incapacity for such duty by boastfully proclaiming in general orders, that the securing of "bases of operations" and "lines of retreat" should be left to the enemy. The enemy promptly secured Pope's

To cap the climax of blundering, if not absolutely criminal stupidity, Major General Henry W. Halleck, who had never marshalled even a squad in the field, was called to Washington, as General in Chief of the Armies of the United States. Stanton thus became strongly reinforced in the carrying out of his system of undoing, and heartily did Halleck and Pope respond to all calls he made upon them to aid him in that direction. All military maxims were disregarded, and the Army of the Potomac was recalled from the line of the James.

This frightful blunder was immediately taken advantage of by General Lee, who made a bold move to reach Washington, by turning its right flank. On the 2d of August, 1862, General Halleck issued orders for the recall of the Army of the Potomac, and on the 9th of that month General "Stonewall" Jackson's advance of Lee's army had crossed the Rapidan and encountered Banks at Cedar Mountain. Battle after battle followed until they culminated in the disgraceful overthrow of Pope at the very gates of the Capital.

Lee thus cleared his line of communications so that his march through the Shenandoah into the Cumberland Valley should be unimpeded.

The danger to the Capital was imminent, and the Government and the people were thoroughly and completely aroused. By the orders of Stanton and Halleck, McClellan had been despoiled of all command, but when dismay spread its dark mantle over Washington, President Lin-

coln telegraphed him "I beg of you to assist me in this crisis, with your ability and experience. I am entirely tired out," and to the utter discomfiture of Stanton and Chase, who would have preferred the surrender of Washington to accepting its safety at the hands of McClellan, placed him at the head of the army for the defence of Washington.

On the 11th of September Longstreet's corps of Lee's army was occupying Hagerstown and vicinity.

McClellan having hastily reorganized the army cautiously followed, covering Washington as he progressed.

The North was now aroused, and political intrigue and schemes of personal advancement had to be dropped for the time being.

Pennsylvania, which was threatened with the horrors and devastation of war upon its soil, made strenuous efforts to resist invasion. Governor Curtin's call upon the people was responded to with alacrity, and soon a large army was gathering on the banks of the Susquehanna. This army was composed principally of the militia. It is somewhat customary to smile when the militia are mentioned in connection with actual war, but the fact cannot be truthfully contradicted that whenever the militia were called out during the war they always filled the part they were called upon to act.

At this time Governor Curtin, having been apprised in advance that Pennsylvania must look out for itself, made the most complete arrangements for the State's defence.

He summoned the militia of the Commonwealth to gather at the border, and there await his arrival.

“Then marched the brave from rocky steep,
From mountain river swift and cold ;
The borders of the stormy deep,
The vales where gathered water sleep,
Sent up the strong and bold.”

They gathered, and I can see them now with their bright guns flashing in the September sunlight ; their fresh blouses with shining buttons ; their canteens overflowing with the cool waters of the Conococheague and their haversacks filled with rations. They were a fine sight to behold as their lines were formed in field and wood. Some of them were imbued with State pride and citizen duty to such a high degree that they hesitated in crossing the border for fear that it would be doing an unconstitutional act. This fact coming to the knowledge of Curtin how grand he looked and how magical the effect when he appeared before the doubting ones and informed them that the border line was only an imaginary one, and assured them that wherever Pennsylvania troops would follow, there Pennsylvania's Governor would lead. So it was that, with all the “pride, pomp and circumstance of glorious war,” with drums beating and banners waving, they bravely crossed the border. The column marched, and in good time arrived at Hagerstown, where its Chief established his headquarters. It then moved out the Williamsport road, along which it was drawn up in line of battle to meet a portion of the

enemy advancing on its front. The position was one of great responsibility and full of danger, and had it not been filled by the militia it would have been necessary to fill it from the army of the Potomac, then engaged with Lee's main forces. Therefore, although not in the battle of Antietam with its shifting scenes of successes and defeats, its carnage and its glories, the Pennsylvania militia are entitled to great praise for assisting in bringing about its results.

On the 13th of September Longstreet's corps of Lee's army was at Hagerstown, his advance having reached there on the 11th. Hill was at the base of South Mountain, and Jackson was investing Harper's Ferry. General McClellan's headquarters were at Frederick.

McClellan had a three-fold duty to perform : to punish Lee, to cover Washington, and to relieve the garrison at Harper's Ferry. This latter duty should not have been imposed upon him, as it weakened his ability to perform the other duties. Harper's Ferry was of no strategic importance, and the attempt to hold it was only to insure the loss of its garrison. McClellan advised its abandonment and the transfer of the troops there to his command. But, as usual, it was only for McClellan to suggest a good for the War Department to frustrate its accomplishment ; and so it was that not until September 12th, was the command at Harper's Ferry placed under McClellan, and that was contingent upon his opening communication with Miles. Communication with Miles had been cut off by Jackson's

rapid movements to capture him, and it was only after this became an ascertained fact that Halleck placed Miles under McClellan's orders, subject to the first mentioned contingency. McClellan saw the impending disaster to Miles and tried to avert it, but the authority given him in the premises, came too late, as subsequent events proved. McClellan now pushed forward rapidly and on Sunday morning encountered Hill at the Boonsborough pass of the South Mountain. Hill made a gallant stand, and was reinforced during the afternoon from Longstreet's corps. The action was a bloody one, and whilst the pæans of victory went to McClellan, Hill accomplished a great result in detaining McClellan long enough to allow Jackson to accomplish the entire discomfiture of Miles, for the next morning that unfortunate officer surrendered 12,520 men, with all the stores and munitions of war at Harper's Ferry, to Jackson.

Jackson was thus enabled to form a junction with Lee and to enter battle with his troops, enthused by their victory, whilst McClellan was handicapped by being deprived of the moral and material support of over twelve thousand additional troops that he should have had with him when the two great armies clashed in battle on the banks of the Antietam.

On the 15th of September McClellan continued his march and late in the afternoon came up with the enemy near Sharpsburg; but he had not sufficient force at that time to warrant an attack. On the 16th a fog prevailed, and

the day was devoted by the gallant antagonists in concentrating their forces, strengthening their lines and maneuvering for position preparatory to the deadly fray so close at hand. Artillery firing was kept up throughout the day, and late in the afternoon Meade's Division, composed of the Pennsylvania Reserves, supported by other Divisions of Hooker's corps, engaged the enemy in a sharp and bloody conflict to which darkness put a stop.

The 17th opened beautifully, with all the splendor of a September sun reflecting its rays over the scene. As the sunlight broke over the contending forces resting on their arms or marching towards the chosen ground the great battle of Antietam was begun at the skirmish line of the Pennsylvania Reserves. Soon after regiment upon regiment, brigade upon brigade, division upon division, and corps upon corps, were thrown into action until not less than one hundred thousand men shared in the glories or suffered in the disasters of the stubborn conflict. From the time of the first firing in the morning until night threw its mantle over the smoke of the field the battle raged with terrific fury, and hope and fear alternated in the breasts of contending sides. Heroism, patriotism and valor wrote their names on history's page all over the sanguinary field which was strewn with nearly twenty-one thousand dead and wounded men. 3,620 dead bodies and 17,365 wounded men attested to the fierceness of the struggle. Neither army could claim a victory in the fight, neither was in a condition to renew the battle next day, but the prestige


went to McClellan, because he retained possession of the field. The results, however, were of great importance to the Government. Washington was now safe from attack and Pennsylvania relieved from threatened invasion.

The reverberations of McClellan's guns at Antietam acclaiming the safety of Washington, had not died upon the air before the enemy in the rear relieved of its fears again set in motion their system or policy of undoing, and it was not long before McClellan's military career came to an end through their intrigues. Antietam closed the first chapter in the history of the war. Patriotism had thus far triumphed, but from the hour that Lee recrossed the Potomac it was placed under a cloud, and partisanism to a greater or less extent controlled the course of subsequent events. Although patriotism was deeply imbedded in the hearts of the army and the people it was at very low ebb in public places. A new party had come into power, and its followers were not only clamorous for the offices, but they adopted every possible measure to perpetuate their hold on public place, and to put in the background all those who did not vote with them at the polls. No matter how patriotic the citizen, how great were his services and sacrifices for the preservation of the Union, if he did not at once bow his head to the decrees of a partisan caucus he was hounded by the party organ and the petty politician and ostracised from participation in public affairs. There was considerable presidential timber in the cabinet which was more or less influenced in public action by party

clamor. From these causes sprung a spirit of intolerance and intrigue, which, in view of the critical condition the Government found itself in, was akin to treason, that resulted in prolonging the war at a fearful expense of precious life and a vast amount of treasure. Of party men, however, there were a few who were too great and with a patriotism too broad who tried to turn back the tide of intolerance and to some extent succeeded. Among their number was Simon Cameron. I well remember the morning, in the Secretary of War's office, when Senator King of New York, came in and reproached Mr. Cameron for appointing Democrats to positions in the army, and Mr. Cameron's reply: "Senator, this is not a war for party, it is for the country, and I am with all those who are for the latter." Mr. Cameron never departed from this broad standard of patriotism whilst he remained in public life. Mr. Lincoln did not partake of the spirit of intolerance, but the radical and intolerant wing of his party were in the majority both in Congress and in his Cabinet, and he was forced at times by the circumstances surrounding him to tolerate what he abhorred.

WILLIAM B. WILSON.

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